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ABSTRACT
The problem of analyzing decisions under risk is
investigated. The vehicle for this investigation is the
single-period inventory model commonly referred to as the
"newsboy problem." The maximum expected value of the profit
is the criteria most often used in making a decision in this
type of problem. This paper analyzes this model in several
ways. It is found that, under some conditions, variance of
profit provides valuable insight into the problem and could
assist the analyst in choosing alternatives for the decision
maker. In addition, it is found that in this model, maxi-
mizing the expected value of profit does not maximize the
probability of attaining at least this maximum expected
profit. Appropriate display of this additional information
allows the decision maker to implicitly assign his utilities
in terms of his preferences when making decisions under risk.
A modification of the expected utility function used by Borch
is also discussed so that, for managers who exhibit decreas-
ing marginal utility for money, some of this additional
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Possibly the most common principle used as a criteria
for making decisions under risk is to choose the action
which maximizes the expected value of profit (or cost or
some other measure of merit)
. Throughout this paper the
measure of merit will be profit. Many examples can be
offered where this criteria is not satisfactory to a manager
who wants information for making a decision, nor is it satis-
factory to explain the behavior of decision makers. See
Morris, Reference 111 . One feature these examples seem to
have in common is that the decisions involved are to be made
once, or at most, a few times.
Another feature that they seem to have in common is that
two decision makers will often make differing decisions. A
good example is insurance; some people insure and some do
not. It is clear then that decision makers use different
principles in making their choices. It is the analyst's
role to be aware of these various criteria and evaluate their
application to a particular problem. The aspiration prin-
ciple - a manager selects from acceptable alternatives rather
than from optimal alternatives, according to Cyert and March
|2J - appears to be an existing decision principle under
risk. Another is the expectation - variance principle (see
Morris [ll ) . This principle, while related to maximum
expected value principle, suggests that more information for

decision making can be gained by attaining knowledge of the
variance of profit. It may be that the manager has decreas-
ing marginal utility for money. Such a manager is termed a
risk averter and, thus, he would view the variance of profit
with aversion (see Morris I ll ) . This additional informa-
tion may lead to a different decision by the manager than
one based solely on maximum expected value.
Another way of looking at decisions under risk is to
attempt to construct a utility function for the manager. If
this is done, an analytic function could be fit to the
manager's constructed utility function and the analyst could
then select alternatives based on this explicit statement of
the decision maker's attitude toward risk. However, this
can result in a more difficult mathematical programming
problem or the utility function may be used for ordering
alternatives which are not like the experimental alternatives
used to construct the utility function.
Quite often these difficulties are avoided in the analy-
sis by choosing the alternative which maximizes expected
profit. This is a relatively easy mathematical programming
which takes the form
•oo
xdGh (x)
where G^(x) is the cumulative distribution function of
profit and is equivalent to taking as a utility function
u-. (x) = x and maximizing the expected value of this utility
function. The difficulty of the mathematical problem grows

rapidly when the next more sophisticated utility function is
2
used, say U2 (x) = x - <*x , «< >0 . The problem is then
Maximize E(Ph ) - c< V(Ph) + [E(Ph)J
(x - o< x2 ) d Gfc (x)
One choice is then presented to the manager and he either
selects it or he doesn't. The use of u-^ (x) has its advan-
tages; it reduces the information down to a single measure
of merit. The advantage is retained at the cost of a more
difficult programming problem when ^(x) is used. In any
case, this scheme has implicitly chosen the decision maker's
utility function for him.
If the manager exhibits decreasing marginal utility for
money and thus has an aversion for variance of profit, then
it may not be necessary to solve a more difficult mathema-
tical programming problem. Various alternatives can be
selected based on variance, and, if necessary, utilities can
be assigned to these selected alternatives.
This thesis, then, is that the analyst can develop addi-
tional probabilistic information which can, at least, sharpen
his insight and the insight of the decision maker into the
various alternatives available, and, at best, provide the
information that will allow a decision maker to implicitly
apply other criteria which reflect his attitude toward risk.
In addition, the analyst may know something about the

decision maker's utility function and be able to assign
utilities to the alternatives.
The medium for this thesis is the single - period
inventory model known as the "newsboy problem." Additional
probabilistic information is derived and calculated keeping
various principles of choice under risk in mind. A modifica-
tion is then suggested for the mathematical model of the
expected utility function for risk averters (see reference
[4J ) . This modified expected utility function is used to
compare pairs of selected alternatives.
To complete the prerequisites, the model most commonly
used to solve the newsboy problem is now stated and discussed.
B. SINGLE - PERIOD INVENTORY MODEL
1. The Model
The newsboy problem is an example of the single -
period inventory model discussed in reference 1 3 J . Assume
that the decision maker has to decide how many items of a
certain product to buy to meet his demands during a certain
period with no choice of re-ordering. He buys an item for
$C and sells it for $S. If he does not sell an item, he can
salvage it for $L (L < C) and if a customer demands an item
and the manager is out of stock, the manager incurs a cost of
$ TT for each item out of stock (this cost is in addition to
lost profit on the lost sale). Demand is a random variable,
X, with a mass or density function f(x) and a cumulative
distribution function (cdf ) , F(x), with a mean jX and a
variance
. The decision variable is the number of items
8

to buy, h. The solution in Hadley and Whitin [3J is to
derive an expression for the expected profit, E(Ph ) , and
i *
maximize with respect to h. This leads to a quantity h
which satisfies, in the continuous case,
*, C-L
F(h*) = — (1)
S-L +/(
where F(x) is the complementary cdf of the demand random
variable X. The discrete case is analogous. The function
ECP^) is usually strictly concave so the solution to equa-
tion (1) is usually unique. Throughout the remainder of the
paper, it will be assumed that demand is normally distribu-
ted.
2. Discussion of the Model
Since X is a random variable, so is profit P^.
Profit, P, is indexed by h to indicate that there is a
different random variable, profit, for each value of h.
The maximum expected value criteria selects the h which
maximizes the expected value of profit. This is equivalent
to selecting the distribution of profit that has the highest
mean. Hillier [5J discusses this problem when there are
two risky investments from which to choose. He derives the
distribution of return on investment for each of the invest-
ments and suggests presenting to the decision maker sketches
of the density functions of the random variable, return on
investment, rather than just presenting the two numbers which
represent the mean return on the investment for each

investment. Such probabilistic information is valuable to
the analyst and to the decision maker. The variance of P-, *
as compared to other distributions of profit may be important
to a decision maker, especially one who is a risk averter.
Does Py* have the smallest variance of all P-^ ? Is there
another P-^ which, even though it has a smaller mean, also
has a smaller variance such that the decision maker may
prefer it to the one with the highest mean? Does P^* have
the highest probability of attaining the manager's aspira-
tion level, or, more interesting, does it have the highest
probability of attaining maximum expected profit?
These then are some of the questions the analyst could
ask and their answers may help the decision maker select an
alternative more suitable to his preferences.
10

II. DERIVATION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
A. VARIANCE OF PROFIT
To obtain the variance of profit, V P^ , the second




= E [ Ph
2
|
x£h] P [xsh] + E [ph2 | x>hj pfx >hl (2)





= [sx - Ch + L (h-x)J
since profit is the selling price times the units demanded
less the cost of the items procured plus the salvage value




= [sh - Ch - TT(x-h)]
since profit is the profit from items procured and sold less
the stock out costs for items demanded but not in stock.
Returning to equation (2)
.h
f(x)dx +E [Ph2 ] =/ [sx - Ch + L(h-x)]
/ [sh - Ch - Tf(x-h)] f(x)dx
h
Little error will occur in taking the first integral from
zero as long as JUL ^3Q.
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In the following form, the E Pft2 ] is easily coded in
FORTRAN IV where subroutines are available to evaluate the







= ( S "L ) 2 (Cf 2 +PL
2
) - 2(S-L)(C-L) hfJL+ (C-L)
+
[
[/T 2 - (s-l) 2 ] {<j
2
+/LL 2 ) - 2(s-c +7T) JT^fJL
I
+ 2(S-L)(C-L)h^+[(S-C +7T) 2 - (C-L) 2]h2 <£ ^-ZjL
+ [?T 2 - (s-l) 2 ] tf(h +/JL ) -2 (j (s-c +7T )7T h
+ 2 CUS-L) (C-L)h (^-7^-)
When demand is normal, the expected profit can be
written
Thus
[ph ] = (S-L)// - (C-L)h + (S-L + 7T ) (h -/JL)<§
- C(S-L +Tt) (p l^h^)
V [ph ] = E [ph2] - E [Ph ]
fh -fJL
(3)
As h increases V Ph approaches (S-L) 2 O . The details
of the above derivation are contained in Appendix A. The cdf
of profit will be derived next.
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B. DISTRIBUTION OF PROFIT
Recall that, given demand x ^ h, profit, P-^ = Sx - Ch
+ L(h-x) and given that x > h, P^ = (S-C)h - f[ (x-h) . The
event that profit for some h will be less than or equal to
some amount y (fixed but arbitrary) is the union of the
events that Sx - Ch + L (h-x) is less than or equal to
y or that (S-C)h - TT(x-h) is less than or equal to y.
These events are disjoint, thus the probability that profit
for some h is less than or equal to y, denoted Gj1 (y) is
the sum of the probabilities of the two events. In symbols,
Gft (y) = P Sx-Ch + L(h-x)^y] + P (S-C)h
- /( (x-h) ± y
j
This is true for y <. (S-C)h since this is the maximum
profit possible. For y 5r (S-C)h, G^ (y) = 1.
Rewriting in terms of the demand distribution,





(S-L) ],[ X > ( S-C+/( )h-yTC
y < (S-C)h
and in terms of the standard normal random variable,
Gh (y) = 1 -$ y+(C-L)h - (S-L)//
(S - L)<J
+







>veIt will be convenient to denote the arguments of Q) abc
as lj_(h) and 1 2 (h) respectively. Note that lj_ and 12
are linear functions in h with positive slopes.
Gh (y) as written above is continuous, as can be
verified. Notice that if /( =0 and thus the cost of
stock out is just the lost profit on a lost sale, the last
term would not appear and the cdf would take a jump at the
maximum profit, (S-C)h. The value of the jump will be
*( *-€* since in this case
Gh (y) = 1 - (£ [l ± (h)] y< (S-C)h
= 1 y > (S-C)h
and letting y = (S-C)h in the first expression gives
1- $
Recall from equation (1) that h* was chosen such that
f
h zU
$(a^ C - LS - L +U
C - L
T^ 113
s - L + Tf £or t 'he k* solution is the probability of
attaining the maximum profit, (S - C)h
In addition to the analytic form of the distribution
being obtained and certain information taken from it (as will
be done below) , the cdf or density function could be drawn
and presented to the decision maker. This procedure was
valuable once alternatives were chosen based on other
14

considerations. This is valuable additional information at
least for the analyst if not for the decision maker and is
discussed by Hillier (see reference I 5j ) who was dealing
with, at most, a few discrete distributions.
C. PROBABILITY OF MAKING A PROFIT AT LEAST AS GREAT AS
SOME FIXED QUANTITY
What distribution of profit P^ maximizes the proba-
bility of making a profit at least as great as z ? A
question such as this comes up when the analyst perceives
that a manager has some profit he wants to attain which is
satisfactory. As mentioned before, Cyert and March (see
reference 1 2j) hypothesize that this is, in fact, how many
decisions are made. In symbols then
Maximize G^z) = (|)[l 1 (h)] -<^)[l 2 (h)]
where z is the decision maker's aspiration level. This
z
expression makes sense as long as z ^ (S-C)h or h "^ , q _r \
since (S-C) h is the maximum possible profit. The function
C-l S-C + TCis clearly concave in h when < t=> , Tf > ,
since these are the slopes of the linear arguments. When
these conditions are met, G^(z) will have a maximum. It
can be seen that the h which satisfies





(4)(S-L) (S-C + /( )
will maximize the probability of making z dollars profit.
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The solution of equation (4) is readily found by searching
standard normal tables.
Expressions for variance of profit, distribution of
profit, distribution of profit and probability of making a
profit as great as some fixed amount are now available. Two
examples are now studied to see how these expressions can be
used to provide additional information for the decision and




A. FIRST EXAMPLE, ft =
The parameters of the first example are: S = $.25,
C = $.19, L = $.15, /U. = 300, (J = 50, and 7T = 0, as used in
Hadley and Whitin (see reference 1 3J ) . To maximize
expected profit, h is chosen to satisfy
# h*
- 300 C - L
50 I S - L +/T ~ * 4
which implies, from the normal tables, h = 313.
1. Use of Variance of Profit to Select Alternatives
Using the expression for the V Pft / equation (3),
the variance of profit was calculated for h and other
values of h. The results are exhibited in Table 1.
TABLE 1
EXPECTED VALUE, VARIANCE OF PROFIT,
AND MAXIMUM PROFIT FOR h AND OTHER SELECTED VALUES
OF h
E(Ph ) v ( ph) MAXIMUM PROFIT
242 $14.25 1
262 15.10 3
27 2 15.44 4
302 16.03 9








From Table 1, the distribution P^ obtained when h = 262
has appeal, for example the mean of ?262 ^- s ^ess t^an one
dollar smaller than the mean of P^* but the variance of
P-^* is more than three times as large as the variance of
p262* Its appeal lies in the fact that it is an alternative
17

]?262 that in some sense has more certainty than P, * . In
any case, the analyst's judgment is used to select this
alternative.
2. Comparison of Selected Alternatives for Decision
Maker Using Distribution of Profit
Table 2 compares the distributions of P^* and
p262* Notice from Table 2 that, in addition to "more
certainty" for maximum profit obtained from Pp.-, P, * has
more probability of attaining less than $15.7 2 than does
P262' a character ist ic not to be overlooked.
TABLE 2
FIRST EXAMPLE, /T=
COMPARISON OF VARIOUS PROFIT DISTRIBUTION
CHARACTERISTICS FOR SELECTED ALTERNATIVES








15.72 < Ph < 18.78]
P-u = 15. 72^








P Ph ^: 15.1o] .69 .81
Admittedly, the judgment of the analyst is required to
select alternatives for comparison? however, the judgment
will be fortified with at least a cursory knowledge of the
18

decision maker's preferences and aspirations. Before, the
decision of how many items to buy was fairly easy to make.
Now, with the additional information and knowledge of the
risk involved, the decision is not so easily made. At this
point the decision maker is required to implicitly assign
his utilities to these choices and make a decision.
B. SECOND EXAMPLE, fC >
1. Use of the Variance of Profit
The same example is used here as for the first
example except J[ - $.50. This example is also solved in
reference |_3j . Table 3 lists the mean and variance of
profit and maximum profit for h* and other selected values
of h.
TABLE 3
MEAN AND VARIANCE OF PROFIT AND MAXIMUM PROFIT
FOR h* AND OTHER SELECTED VALUES OF h





















Table 3 shows that P-^* does not have the smallest
variance of all distributions of profit; however, the differ-
ence is small. This small difference also exists for this
example when all parameters are varied including the vari-
ance of demand. In the first example, the variance of Pofi?
was much smaller than the variance of P-v* for a small
decrease in expected value. When /T ^>0» this is not the
case.
The variance of profit as a function of the decision
variable takes on its minimum very close to h and the
function is very flat in the region of h . Accordingly,
the variance of profit does not help in the selection of
presentable alternatives.
If the analyst perceives that the decision maker may be
guided by the aspiration level principle, he can now turn
to using the expressions developed in Section II, C, for the
probability of making a profit at least as great as some
fixed quantity.
2. Use of Probability of Making at Least as Great a
Profit as Some Fixed Quantity
The value of this information is revealed by solving
equation (4) to see if h* maximizes the probability of
attaining at least the maximum expected profit E (P^*) =





PROBABILITY OF MAKING AT LEAST E(Ph *)
FOR SELECTED VALUES OF h








h* = 375 .5464 14.12
Table 4 reveals that h = 359 gives a higher proba-
bility for maximum expected profit than the h which
implies that E (Pft) is maximum. If this amount (359) were
bought, the expected profit would be $13.74 but here
P p359 ^ 14.12] > P Ph * > 14.12] . The fact that
the differences of probabilities are small is not important.
If the decision maker's aspiration level was $14.12, then
P359 may be optimal for him. Not knowing explicitly what
his aspiration level is, a table could be constructed giving
the value of h which maximizes the probability of making
a fixed amount for various values of possible aspiration
levels. That is, solve equation (4) for appropriately
selected values of z .
21

It is desirable to attempt to simplify some of this




IV. ASSIGNING A MEASURE OF MERIT TO
SELECTED ALTERNATIVES
The objection could be raised that some of this additional
information may confuse a manager rather than assist him in
making a decision. This objection is acknowledged and an
attempt is made to deal with it. But another objection also
has to be acknowledged. This objection arises in implicitly
presenting to the decision maker the expected value of profit
as a certain quantity with no indication of the risk. If it
is not presented this way, then, to really explain what it
means, requires the discussion of variance of some measure of
how much the actual profit realization may differ from the
mean. In either case, is this not a source of possible
confusion also?
A. BORCH'S MODEL
Consider the class of decision makers who exhibit
decreasing marginal utility for money. There are various
schemes for constructing a utility function of such decision
makers. See reference 111 and [6j . For this class of deci-
sion makers, the utility function could be fitted with a
parabola of the form x - <kx2 , <* > o for payoffs x -^ 1/2 °< .
(This restriction is required since for x > 1/2 <* the
slope of the parabola is negative which would violate common
sense notions of utility.) This utility function is studied
by Borch [4J . Markowitz [7J has shown that proper use
of the expected value and variance of profit as suggested
above is equivalent to maximizing the expected value of such
23

a utility function and he gives justification for using the
expected value along with the variance as decision parameters.
A manager whose preferences imply such a utility function
exhibits an aversion to the variance of distributions which
the utility function is to order. This aversion is measured
by the value of ^ , To be specific , the expected value of
x - <s.x^ over the profit distribution is
E(Ph ) - E (Ph
2
) = E(Ph ) - -<V(Ph ) - «*[E(Ph )]
2
so that it is the second moment, E (P, ) , which is the
measure of the variance used to order the profit distribu-
tions rather than the variance of profit, V (PO • There is
no way to write a separate function which will result in
expected utility being E(Ph) - ocvCP^). See reference l4j
for further reasons for this choice and some examples.
B. MODIFICATION OF BORCH'S MODEL
With the expected utility function in this form, the
implication is that all the variance of a given distribution
is "bad." Morris 111 arrives at this conclusion when he
says that a manager who has such a utility function when
presented with two distributions with the same mean would
prefer the distribution with the smaller variance.
1. Motivational Example
A possible counter example to the above "principle"
is considered. This example also demonstrates the value of
more explicit analysis of decisions under risk. Consider
24

two alternatives where, in the first, profit has a gamma
distribution, ( p ]_) » with a mean of 2 and variance of 2;
and, in the second, where profit (P2 ) » ^as a nornia l distri-
bution with a mean of 2 and a variance of 1. The prin-
ciple that one selects the alternative that has smaller
variance when the means are the same suggests that one
select alternative P2 if one exhibits decreasing marginal
utility for money.
Using Borch's expected utility function to order the two
alternatives, the expected utility for P-^ is
E(P ± ) - c<( V(P X ) + [e(Pi)]
whereas the expected utility of P2 is
(P2 ) -
o< V(P 2 ) + [e(p 2 )]
= 2 - 6o<
= 2 - 5<x
which is clearly larger for any o< > 0, agreeing with the
above principle of choosing P 2 .
Further analysis shows that the above result and
"principle" may not validly order the decision maker's pre-
ferences properly even though he exhibits decreasing mar-
ginal utility for money. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the
.b
values of P a £ P . *£ b , / x^g i (. x^ dx.^ and
g-j^x^ dx i for i = 1, 2 where g^ is the appro-
priate density function for profit alternative P^. These
25

quantities are defined as fractional probabilities, frac-
tional means and fractional second moments, respectively.
TABLE 5
FRACTIONAL PROBABILITIES FOR PROFIT DISTRIBUTIONS
(a,b) (-00,0) (0,1) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) (5,00)
.000 .264 .330
.023 .136 .341
.207 .108 .051 .040
.341 .136 .022 .001
TABLE 6
FRACTIONAL MEANS FOR PROFIT DISTRIBUTIONS





.500 .470 .130 .245




FRACTIONAL SECOND MOMENTS FOR PROFIT DISTRIBUTIONS







1.260 1.280 1.010 1.590
1.778 1.190 .302 .029
6
5
As an example to help understand the meaning of the above
tables, consider Table 6.
26

E (P 2 )
= E (P2 ) I -oo ^P 2 ^ 1 P -oo <*. p^ ^ o]
+ E (P 2 ) 0^P 2 ^1 Pj 0^P2 ^1 +...
+ E [(p 2 ) j BZP^oo P [ 5 ^ P 2 ^oo
'
E (P 2 ) = -.008 + .083 + ... + .007 = 2
The implications of Tables 5, 6, and 7 when making
decisions under risk are apparent when one considers Table 7.
For P-l, 86% of E(P-i_ 2 ) lies to the right of E(P-l) whereas
only 66% of E(P 2 2 ) lies to the right of E(P 2 ). Motivated
by the idea, that the measure of dispersion of a distribu-
tion which measures the possibility of making profits that
are larger than what is expected, is "good," this measure is
termed "good variance." For the analogous reason, the




2 g i (x i) dxi
ft
and "bad variance" is
-oo
2
xi 9i (x i> dxi •
Ui
These definitions are dependent on the measure of merit. If




With these ideas in mind, consider the above tables and
note that in Table 5 for Pj_ there is no probability of
losing money (negative profit) while P 2 offers a .023
probability of losing money. Is there really any risk asso-
ciated with making large amounts of profit? Is P,
defaulted when 85% of its second moment is larger than what
one expects for a payoff? Is it completely obvious that,
even though one has an aversion to risk, one should choose
P2 because it has smaller variance? It is expected that
P-, would be preferred to P2 by many, if not all, risk
averters.
A proposal to resolve this difficulty by modifying
somewhat Borch's model for the expected utility function for
a manager who exhibits decreased marginal utility for money
is made in the next section.
2. The Modification
Let c< = o< 1 - o<r2 , o< 1 > =K 2 ,
c^
1 > 0, < 2 > 0,
where <=< , can be thought of as a measure of how much a
manager dislikes losses while c< is how much he likes
gains. Since c< > << , c< > is still the measure of
risk aversion in the model. The expected utility function
now becomes
H - -1 /
fJL roo




as it will be used to order pairs of alternatives. A simple
calculation using Tables 6 and 7 shows, for any feasible
28

<< /e<2 ' ^i > ^o ' that p i would be ordered as preferred
to P 2 .
It should be noted that a utility function could not be
written which would result in expected utility as stated
above. Therefore, the usefulness of the above is found in
comparing alternatives with known mean and variance. It
will not help one choose alternatives or could not be used
in a mathematical programming problem to maximuze expected
utility. It will assist, however, in ordering those alter-
natives selected by such methods suggested above and else-
where.
Note that, in the comparison of the gamma distribution
and normal distribution, the appeal of the gamma distribu-
tion lies in its skewness in the direction of higher profits.
This results in the larger percentage of "good variance."
In this way, the use of the expected utility measure sug-
gested here takes into account skewness of a distribution.
Borch points out I
SJ
that an obvious limitation of the
method of ordering probability distributions with a utility
function of the form x - »< x2 , o< ~y , is that it takes
into consideration only the first two moments of the distri-
bution. Suggested herein is a way to practically account
for skewness of a distribution (which third moment measures)
when ordering sets of distributions.
The goal of this chapter is to attempt to assign a
single measure of merit to the alternatives selected above.
To demonstrate how this could be done, the first example,
29

in which the variance of profit was important, is now
considered.
3. Use of Modified Expected Utility Function in the
First Example
In the first example it was suggested that a
distribution which had a smaller variance may have some
appeal to some managers. This is reasonable if the manager
has preferences which exhibit decreasing marginal utility
for money. If so, then the modified expected utility
function may help to reduce this to a single measure of
merit. Thus, the second moments and bad variance were com-
puted for the two alternatives selected in the first example
and are recorded in Table 8.
TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF SECOND MOMENTS AND BAD
VARIANCE FOR SELECTED ALTERNATIVES
h*=313 h=262 Feasible c< in Borch's Model
Total E(Ph
2
) 269 231 1/40 < °< < 1/38
Bad Variance 65 30
The derivation needed for the above calculations is shown in
Appendix B.
The feasible range for ©< in Table 8 is arrived at by
noting that o< can be no bigger than l/2x where x is
largest profit that x - <x x is to order. This is about
$19.00. The lower bound on ©<. is the smallest ©< such
that P262 is ordered as preferred to Pft*. The lower
30

bound is not zero because in using the expected utility
function E (Ph ) - o< e (Ph
2
) / ?h * is taken only as 269/231
more risky than ?262* But -*-n terms of getting less profit
than expected (when what is expected differs so little) P *
is measured more than twice as risky (65/30) . It should be
noted that good variance was defined in terms of the mean of
the given distribution. In section IV, B, above, the means
of the distributions being compared were the same. Here
they are not and thus the good variance is a measure of
getting more profit than expected when you pick a particular
distribution with its associated mean. Since the expected
utility function contains the mean, the difference in mean
will order the distribution properly and the good and bad
variance will order the distribution according to how much
the distribution deviates from what is expected.
Thus the modified expected utility measure will always
order the distribution ?262 as Pre ^erre(^ to ph* no
matter what feasible o< , and °< 2 are chosen. If
°< - 1/40 and the manager dislikes losses say twice as much
as liking gains (i.e. <*C'^/ c* 2 = 2) then °^1 = 2/40 and
*<
2
= 1/40. Thus E U (Ph *) =17.9 and E U (P262) = 18 - 6 -
This agrees with the knowledge gained by looking at Table 2
as to how much more risky P, * is than p262 "
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
For the single-period inventory problem, the variance of
profit, the distribution of profit, and an expression which
usually yields the order quantity which maximizes the proba-
bility of making a given profit have been derived when demand
is normal. There is no difficulty in doing the same deriva-
tions when demand is other than normally distributed. It
was seen that this additional information gives the analyst
and the decision maker valuable insight into the problem by
explicitly displaying the risks involved and allows the
decision maker to implicitly assign his preferences based on
his total knowledge of his environment and thus his atti-
tudes toward risk.
A way was suggested that, if necessary, given more
knowledge of the attitude of some managers toward risk,
measures of merit can be practically assigned which will
order selected alternative profit distributions.
These specific results may not be applicable to all
decisions under risk but it was seen that additional proba-
bilistic information of this kind may result in a decision
more appropriate to the decision maker's attitude toward
risk than maximizing expected profit. Much of this informa-
tion was obtained without the existence of a utility func-
tion and without a difficult mathematical programming solu-
tion.
The probabilistic information derived in any given
problem has to be guided by the nature of the problem and
32

the questions posed by the analyst and manager rather than by
the use of the specific results derived here.
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APPENDIX A - DERIVATION OF VARIANCE OF PROFIT
From the discussion in section II, A, the second moment
E(P 2 ) is
h
E(P 2 ) = / [ (S-L) x - (C-L) h] f (x) dx +
O




where the subscript h is dropped since here it is clear
that E(P 2 ) and E(P) are functions of h. After carrying
out some algebra
E(P 2 ) = (S-L) 2 / x2 f(x) dx - 2(S-L)(C-L) h / xf(x)dx
r
h r
+ (C-L) 2 h2 / f(x)dx + (S-C +7T ) 2 h2 / f(x)dx
- r
- 2 (S-C + /( ) / x f (x)dx
r
00
+ TC I x2 f(x)dx.
Jh
Rewriting the first three integrals and carrying out some
algebra,
E(P 2 ) = (S-L) 2 (<J 2 +/JL 2 ) - 2 (S-L) (C-L) hyU + (C-L) 2 h
+ [ IX
2




+ 2(S-L) (C-L) h - 2 (S-C +/T) Tf hi / x f(x)dx
+ (S-C +/7) 2 h2 - (C-L) 2 h2 ] I f(x) dx
Using equations (1) , (3) and (24) in Appendix 4 of reference
3 where (7) (x) and (t) (x) are the density function and
complementary cdf of the standard normal distribution
-oo
x2 £ (x) dx = ( C 2 + II 2 ) $ ( ^]+ (J (h + /X )0(^)
r°xf(x) dx= cr0(^) + w$(^]
and
f (x) dx = 4> (^)
are substituted to yield after regrouping
E(P 2 ) = (S-L) 2 ((J 2 +JJL 2 ) - 2 (S-L) (C-L) h/JL + (C-L) 2 h2
+ [ (Tf
2
- (s-l) 2 )(0' 2 +/X 2 ) - 2 (s-c + 7T ) 7T h/U
+ 2(S-L)(C-L) h// + (S-C +7T) 2 ^2 - (C-L) 2 h2 ] (J) fe^
+[ (7T 2 - (s-l) 2 ) cT(h +// ) - 2 Cj (s-c +7D/Th
+ 2 O'(S-L) (C-L) h] (p y&
The above expression is easily coded in Fortran IV.
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APPENDIX B - DERIVATION OF EXPRESSIONS FOR CALCULATING
FRACTIONAL SECOND MOMENT
From section II, C.
y + (C-L)h - (S-L)yU










dy y < (S-C)h
y = (S-C)h
otherwise.
The expected value of utility is
E(ph ) r°°
EU(Ph ) = E(Ph ) x I Y
2dGh (y) + 2 / Y
Z dGj^y)
<oo E(Ph )
It is only necessary to evaluate the first integral since
E(P^ ) to the right of E(Ph ) can be obtained by subtrac-









since E(Ph ) < (S-C)h .


















/ [(S-L) 2 CT 2 z 2 - 2(S-L)(C-L) hz + 2 (S-L) 2/LL (j z +
«oo
(C-L) 2 h2 - 2(S-L)(C-L)h
/
a + (S-L) 2// 2
]
(z) dz
After carrying out the indicated algebra and making the
following substitutions from Appendix 4 of reference 3




z (z) dz = -
-£oo
and of course
I z (z) dz = - 0(r)
r ^o
0(z) dz = 1 - r
00
/ 0(z) dz - 1 - <|>(r)
-ioo r*
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